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Abstract
This paper contributes to the discussion of the compatibility of con-
sumers’ behavior in "real" life with GARP. Within expenditure panel data
we observe a relatively low rate of violation (240 out of 3630 households).
We show that these violations do not imply an "irrational" behavior of the
agents, but can be attributed to a change in the agents’ choice conditions
during a period of time, which includes a shift from a centrally planned
towards a market oriented economy.
Keywords: GARP, Shadow prices.
JEL Classification: C14, D11, D12
Violation de GARP, Distortion de l’environnement économi-
que et Prix virtuels: Analyse à partir de données de panel
Résumé
Cet article discute de la compatibilité du comportement des consommateurs
dans la vie réelle avec l’axiome GARP. A partir du panel polonais de 1987 à
1990, nous montrons que seulement 240 des 3630 ménages violent GARP. Ces
violations ne semblent néanmoins pas indiquer un comportement irrationnel:
elles correspondraient plutôt à des changements dans les conditions de choix
des agents dans une période caractérisée par le passage d’une économie de ra-
tionnement à une économie de marché.
Mots Clés: GARP, Prix virtuels.
Classification JEL: C14, D11, D12
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1 Introduction
Non-parametric tests applied to aggregate time series data confirm,
in general, the hypothesis of a representative agent maximizing util-
ity function. Neither Varian [1982] analyzing aggregate consump-
tion data, nor Swofford and Whitney [1986], who analyzed
quarterly data on monetary assets in the USA for the period 1969:1-
1979:4, found a violation1 of the GARP axiom (Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference). Chalfant and Alston [1988], analyzing
US meat demand from 1947 to 1983 and Australian quarterly meat
demand from 1961:1 to 1984:4, tested the consistency of the data
with an axiom called SARP (Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference)
which is more restrictive than GARP. They found no violation for
the US and only two violations for Australia. The reason for such a
result over aggregate time series data is now well-known: when us-
ing aggregate data, few or no budget hyperplanes intersect, leading
to a trivial respect for GARP.
On the contrary, non-parametric tests performed over micro-economic
data do not give a clear cut answer concerning consumers’ respect
of rationality axioms (GARP, SARP, WARP). For instance, Mat-
tei [1994], using a monthly Swiss Consumer Panel Data (1975-89)2
showed that half of the households, and all households whose choices
were recorded during at least 60 months, violated GARP. This issue
especially concerns the 19 households whose choices were recorded
from 1975 to 1989. Sippel [1997, page 1443], over two experimental
consumer data sets of 12 and 30 individuals respectively, concluded
the following: "We find a considerable number of violations of the re-
vealed preference axioms, which contradicts the neo-classical theory
of the consumer maximizing utility subject to budget constraint. We
should therefore pay closer attention to the limits of this theory as a
description of how people actually behave, i.e. as a positive theory
of consumer behavior". The author indeed has found out in his first
experiment that 11 individuals (over a total of 12) violated SARP
and 5 individuals (41.7%) violated GARP. He also found out, in his
second experiment, that 22 individuals (over a total of 30) violated
SARP and 19 violated GARP. Mattei [2000], over three experi-
mental consumer data sets, reached the same result3. However, a
1However some violations are found over some subsets of the entire data, simply indicating
general interaction between monetary assets.
2It actually includes several overlapped sets of panel data over the time period since only
19 households remained from 1975 to 1989.
3See also Andreoni and Miller [2002] or Harbaugh et al. [2001].
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paper4 by Février and Visser [2004] over two experimental data
sets of respectively 60 and 60 individuals found that "only" 35 (over
120) individuals (29%) violate GARP. Moreover, Famulari [1995],
using repeated cross-sections of households from the 1982-1985 Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey5 divided into mutually exclusive 43 de-
mographic groups according to eight demographic characteristics,
found out that 42 groups respected GARP.
In order to explain the purpose of our paper, let us make two
remarks:
First, recall that the GARP (or SARP, WARP) test is based on
the preference which is revealed by the data sets. Therefore, the
GARP test is valid only if this preference revealed by the data sets
is the agent’s true preference. This implies that sometimes a viola-
tion of GARP (or SARP, WARP) simply means that the preference
revealed by the data sets (the revealed preference) is not the agent’s
true preference. For instance, if the agent has changed his prefer-
ence at least once over the period of investigation, then the revealed
preference is not the agent’s true preference, and this preference in-
stability may lead to a violation of GARP. Another example would
be where the constructed budget domain (constructed from the ob-
served quantity-vectors x and prices p) is not the agent’s true do-
main: there is a budget set B0 over which the agent in fact chooses
and which does not belong to the constructed domain. This case
can arise if the budget sets are nonlinear in the sense of Matzkin
[1991], or if some of the observed price vectors (the price vectors in
the data sets) are not the price vectors actually used by the agent
(i.e. the agent uses a complete price which includes an unobservable
non-monetary component).
Second, let us recall that the GARP test aims to test the existence
of a utility function that rationalizes the data set. From a math-
ematical standpoint, a utility function is an order homomorphism.
Therefore, over a finite set, having an agent’s utility represented by
a utility function is equivalent to this agent’s preference relation be-
ing complete and transitive. However, as shown by the literature on
the theory of preference relation, the agents’ preference relations are
not transitive in general. Unfortunately, such an agent with a non-
transitive preference relation will violate GARP and SARP, even if
4The subjects are not, as usual, recruited from the university staff or students, but are
randomly selected from the population of Dijon, France.
5Annual household expenditures are aggregated in nine categories and prices are differen-
tiated according to the metropolitan area.
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his or her choice corresponds to the optimal element with respect to
her preference relation.
The main conclusion from our paper is the following: a test of
GARP needs to be accompanied by an empirical analysis of the
reasons why some individuals violate GARP6. Otherwise, we can
conclude that these individuals are "irrational" while they are most
emphatically "rational". This dilemma is not trivial, since the stan-
dard non-parametric robustness tests (checking for trivial respect of
the axioms, Afriat efficiency tests, power...) are not helpful in deal-
ing with this issue. For instance, as argued above, if the observed
budget domain, constructed from the observed quantity-vectors x
and prices p, is not the agent’s true domain, then a test of GARP
on this domain may lead to a violation of GARP even if the agent
is "rational".
We used a panel data of 3630 households (Polish Consumer Panel
Data 1987-1990) over a period with very high price variations and
smaller, real income variations. Thus, budget hyperplane intersec-
tions were likely to occur, and the violation of axioms as well. We
tested the axioms (GARP, SARP, and WARP) over a panel data
of 3630 households (Polish Consumer Panel Data 1987-1990). We
found that 240 households over 3630 formally violated the rational-
ity axioms. It seems, however, according to our various tests and
analysis, that even these 240 households are actually utility function
maximizers.
Indeed, when we analyze the revealed preference relations of the
240 households who violated GARP, we find that over the 240 re-
vealed preferences, 189 are preorders (complete and transitive), 16
are partial order (reflexive, transitive but non complete), and 35
are acyclic. Since partial orders can be extended into preorders
without loss of generality (according to the extension theorem of
Szpilrajn), then 205 households who violate GARP are preorder
preference maximizers (that is, they maximize a utility function).
And this is contradictory, since utility function maximizing implies
the fulfillment of GARP. Hence under the assumption that the opti-
mizing principle is fulfilled, it is more likely that the associated con-
structed budget domain F (constructed from the observed quantity-
vectors x and prices p) of the 240 violating households is not true:
6Even in the case of experimental data sets (see Diaye and Wong-Urdanivia [2008]).
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the observed revealed preference R is not the true preference of a
violating household. And if we suppose that that the households’
non-observed true preferences (denoted R′) are preorder preferences,
then it must be the case that the price distributions that the house-
holds use in order to determine their true non-observed preferences
R′ are necessarily different from the observed monetary price distri-
butions used to determine the revealed preference R. We interpret
the prices used by the households to determine R′ as their com-
plete prices; that is p′i = pi + pii ; where pi is the observed mone-
tary price and pii is an unobserved shadow price corresponding to
non-monetary resources and to constraints faced by the households.
Hence, the true budget domain is F ′ while the statistician observes
F . That is, the revealed preference R built from F is an approxima-
tion of R′ built from F ′ : the 240 violating households face a change
in their choice conditions7 so the displayed revealed preferences R
are different from their underlying true preferences R′.
Our explanation is corroborated by two empirical findings:
First, Polish households seem to have been confronted with dras-
tic subsistence constraints (which can correspond to shadow price
effects) during 1987-1990. Indeed, their level of well-being was much
affected by inflation and macroeconomic shocks: between 1988 and
1989, the real income per UC for households belonging to the first
quartile decreased by 30% and increased by the same amount for
households belonging to the last quartile. An inverse change oc-
curred between 1989 and 1990.
Second, we tested, through an econometric model, the assump-
tion that during this period the 240 violating households faced a
change in their shadow prices, through drastic modifications of their
non-monetary resources (such as a substitution between the mon-
etary and non-monetary component of price due to the existence
of queuing during the pre-transition period) and the appearance of
new constraints (such as subsistence constraints). We computed the
shadow prices by estimating a Quadratic Demand System separately
for the two types of households. And we found out that the change in
shadow prices (identified by the endogeneity biases on cross-section
estimations) is large for both populations and significantly greater
for the violating households during the whole period. Thus the vi-
olation of rationality axioms by the 240 households seems to be a
"rational" adjustment of their behavior to special choice conditions.
7We have checked, of course, for other reasons.
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This paper includes 6 sections. Section 2 introduces the non-
parametric tests. Section 3 is devoted to the Polish Consumer Panel
Data (1987-1990). Section 4 deals with the non-parametric tests’
results, and in section 5 we estimate a parametric econometric model
of complete prices. Section 6 is the conclusion.
2 The non-parametric tests
Let D = {(xi, pi)}Ni=1 be a data set including prices pi ∈ Rn+ and
bundles of goods xi ∈ Rn+ purchased at price pi.
In order to define WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference),
GARP (Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference) and SARP (Strong
Axiom of Revealed Preference), we need to recall the definition of
the so-called revealed preference R :
∀ xi, xj, xi R xj if pixj ≤ pixi (2.1)
The interpretation of R is the following: A bundle of goods xi is
revealed preferred to xj, at the price vector pi if xj could have been
chosen by the agent while xi is chosen. Indeed, at the price vector
pi, xj is less expensive than xi, but the latter is the one which is, as
observed, chosen by the agent.
Let us also state the definition of the so-called strict revealed
preference RS :
∀ xi, xj, xi RS xj if pixj < pixi (2.2)
Let R∗ be the transitive closure of R, the SARP required R∗ to be
antisymmetric, the WARP (Samuelson [1948]) required revealed
preference relation R to be antisymmetric while the GARP (Varian
[1982]) required bilateral asymmetry of R∗ and RS : ∀ xi, xj ∈
X, xi R
∗ xj ⇒ not(xj RS xi).
It is obvious that SARP implies GARP and WARP. However,
there is no relationship in general8 between GARP and WARP.
8Nevertheless, in two-dimensional Euclidean space, the three axioms are equivalent
(Samuelson [1948], Rose [1958]). Moreover, if we restrict ourselves to the class of univa-
lent choice functions (choice functions C such that CardC(S) = 1, whatever S a choice set),
then GARP implies WARP.
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When a data set D = {(xi, pi)}Ni=1 fulfills SARP then there exists
a stable local non-satiated complete order preference (transitive, an-
tisymmetric, complete) Q ⊆ Rn+ × Rn+ which rationalizes the data
set ∀x ∈ Rn+ such that pix ≤ pixi, and we have xiQx. There exists
a utility function that rationalizes the data set D. There also exists
a demand function that rationalizes the data set D.
When a data set D fulfills GARP then there exists a stable lo-
cally non-satiated preorder (transitive, complete) preference which
rationalizes the data. There is a utility function that rationalizes the
data set, and there is a demand correspondence that rationalizes the
data set.
When the data set fulfills WARP then there exists a stable lo-
cally non-satiated complete and antisymmetric preference which ra-
tionalizes the data. There is a function that rationalizes the data
(but nothing can be said about the nature of this function).
3 The Data
Household budget surveys have been realized in Poland for many
years. During the analyzed period, the annual total sample size
was about 30 thousand households. The data was collected by a
rotation method on a quarterly basis. The master sample consists
of households and persons living in randomly selected dwellings.
The full description of the master sample generating procedure is
given by Kordos and Kubiczek [1991].
As to the sub-samples, the first pair of sub-samples were surveyed
from 1986 to 1989 (survey period being four years) and replaced by
new sub-samples in 1990. A second pair of sub-samples of the same
size was surveyed from 1987 to 1990.
Over this four-year period, on every annual sub-sample, it is
possible to identify households participating in the surveys. The
number of checked and tested households is 3736. However, 3630
households remain in the data set after deleting households with
missing values. The available information is detailed concerning the
cross-sectional surveys: all typical socio-economic characteristics of
households and individuals are present, as well as details on income
and expenditures. Household expenditures are aggregated into nine
categories: Food, Alcohol and Tobacco, Culture, Energy, Clothing,
Housing, Medical Care and Hygiene, Transportation and Commu-
nication, "Other".
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A large part of this panel (the one containing demographic and in-
come variables) is included in the comparable international database
of panels subject to PACO project (Luxembourg) and is publicly
available.
Prices and price indices are those reported by the Polish Statis-
tical Office (GUS) for main expenditure items. They are quarterly
observed and differentiated by 4 social categories: workers, retired
people, farmers, and dual activity persons (farmers and workers).
This distinction implicitly covers geographical differentiation: work-
ers and retired live mostly in large and average sized cities, farmers
live in the countryside, and dual activity persons live mostly in the
countryside and in small towns. The individual price index differ-
ences can be interpreted as a consequence of the behavioral speci-
ficity determined by the social class, life cycle, and consumption
needs. The regional differentiation is less significant in the context
of the panel’s period that covers the time of administrated prices,
which is identical for the whole country (1987-1989). Only coexist-
ing free (or parallel) markets might have created some influence on
regional average price differences. These differences are taken into
account through social differentiation.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix II provide some descriptive infor-
mation about the Polish data. The period 1987-1990 covered by the
Polish panel is unusual even in Polish economic history. It repre-
sents the shift from a centrally planned, rationed economy (1987) to
a relatively unconstrained and fully liberal market economy (1990).
GDP grew by 4.1% between 1987 and 1988, but fell by .2% between
1988 and 1989 and by 11.6% between 1989 and 1990. Price increases
across these pairs of years were 60.2%, 251.1% and 585.7%, respec-
tively. Thus, the transitory years 1988 and 1989 have produced a
period of a very high inflation and a mixture of free-market, shadow,
and administrated economy.
4 The Results of the Non-parametric Tests
4.1 Tests
Over the 3630 households, 3390 respect SARP, and then GARP, and
WARP, and 240 violate the axioms SARP, GARP, and WARP. The
robustness tests (including the power) are discussed in Appendix I.
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Table 1. Simultaneous tests of SARP, GARP and WARP.
Respect of SARP, Non Respect of SARP,
GARP and WARP: GARP and WARP:
Number of violation = 0 Number of violation 6= 0
Number of households 3390 240
Concerning the 240 violating households, there are two possibil-
ities. Either the observed revealed preferences (denoted R) are the
households true preferences or they are not their true preferences.
1. If R is the true preference, then the associated observed bud-
get domain F (constructed from the observed quantity-vectors
x and prices p) is also the true budget domain (since R is built
from the budget domain F ). Therefore, if R is a preorder (or
if R is a partial order9), then "GARP is violated" implies nec-
essarily that the "optimizing principle is violated". Otherwise,
we will have a contradiction between the violation of GARP
and the fact that the agent is a utility function’s maximizer. If
R is only acyclic, then "GARP is violated" either implies that
the optimizing principle is violated or implies that the violation
of GARP is caused by the non-transitive structure of R.
2. If R is not the true preference then the associated observed
budget domain F is also not the true budget domain. Hence,
the violation of GARP is apparent; it is a violation from the
point of view of the statistician who works with F .
Let us assume that the optimizing principle is fulfilled by the
agent. Under this assumption the associated observed budget do-
main F can not be the true one, because if F is the true one then R
(the revealed preference) is also the true preference. However, when
we analyze10 the revealed preference relations of the 240 households
who violated GARP, we find out that over the 240 revealed pref-
erences, 189 are preorders (complete and transitive), 16 are partial
order (reflexive, transitive but non complete), 23 are complete and
acyclic, and 12 are reflexive-acyclic but non complete. Since partial
orders can be extended into preorders without loss of generality, then
205 (85.41%) households who violated GARP are preorder prefer-
ence maximizers (that is, they maximize a utility function). And this
is contradictory. Hence, under the assumption that the optimizing
9A partial order is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. It can be extended into a
preorder according to the extension theorem of Szpilrajn.
10Results available upon request from the authors.
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principle is fulfilled, it is more likely that the associated (observed)
budget domain F of the 240 violating households is not the true: the
observed revealed preference R is not the true preference of a violat-
ing household. And if we suppose that the households’ non-observed
true preferences (denoted R′) are preorder preferences, then it must
be the case that the price distributions that the households use in
order to determine their true non-observed preferences R′ are neces-
sarily different from the observed monetary price distributions used
to determine R (the revealed preference).
We interpret the prices used by an household to determine R′ as
its complete prices, that is p′i = pi + pii; where pi is the observed
monetary price and pii is an unobserved shadow price corresponding
to non-monetary resources and to constraints faced by the house-
hold. Hence, the true budget domain is F ′ while the statistician
observes F . That is, the revealed preference R built from F is an
approximation of R′ built from F ′.
Of course, one may propose many other explanations. For in-
stance:
Explanation (a). The agents are actually households. Therefore,
the structure of the revealed preference R may simply express
a problem of intra-household allocation.
Explanation (b). The agent has changed his preferences at least
once over the period covered by the data set, so the observed
revealed preference is a mix of the agent’s preferences over the
period.
According to Table 2, the distribution of single-households/non
single-households is almost identical for the violating households and
the non-violating households : 10.4% of the 240 violating households
are single-households and 89.6% are non single-households; 9.3% of
the 3390 non-violating households are single-households and 90.7%
are non single-households. Therefore, explanation (a) does not seem
to be plausible.
Concerning explanation (b), Table 3 below points out that the
year 1989 is involved in most of the violations. Indeed, 1989 is the
year where the microeconomic and macroeconomic shocks started in
Poland. Moreover, Table 3 seems to suggest that the agents did not
face a change of their preferences over the period. If the violating
agents did change their preferences over this period, then we should
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expect this change to happen in 1989. However, for 42 households,
the pair {x87, x88} is involved in the violations.
Therefore, we favor the explanation stating that the 240 vio-
lating households faced a change in their choice conditions, so the
displayed revealed preferences R are different from their underlying
true preferences R′.
Table 2. Single Households/Non Single-Households.
Number of Single-Households Non Single-Households Total
Violating Households 25 215 240
Non-Violating Households 314 3076 3390
Total 339 3291 3630
Table 3. Pairs involved in Violations.
Number of households where {xi, xj} is involved in the violation
{x87, x88} 42 households
{x87, x89} 48 households
{x87, x90} 42 households
{x88, x89} 52 households
{x88, x90} 28 households
{x89, x90} 48 households
4.2 What Economic Explanation for the observed viola-
tions?
4.2.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics
A Logit estimation on the violations (Table 2.3 in Appendix II)
shows that no classic socio-economic characteristics such as the
household’s demographic structure and location, the head of house-
hold’s age, profession or education, and the survey’s quarter is sig-
nificant (at 5%) in predicting violations11. The retired people are
the only social category for which a significant increase in violation
probability has been observed.
On the other hand, the violations are strongly related to the
changes in the household’s economic and demographic situation.
There is a positive and significant relationship between the proba-
bility of axiom violation and the change in real per Unit of Con-
sumption (UC) total expenditure in observed periods between 1987
and 1990. The effect is the strongest and the most significant for
11This result remains true when restricting the estimation to those households for which
the expenditure evaluated at constant price change between two surveys is smaller than 20%
(there remain 3263 households), 15%, 10% or 5%.
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the last period (1989-90), which coincides with the economic transi-
tion shock in Poland. Thus, both factors contribute to the violation
process: the way the change in individual well being is taken into
account and the impact of structural changes in the whole economy.
In the period 1989-1990, a dramatic loss in the purchasing power was
accompanied by a shift from a rationing situation on the consump-
tion goods market to an almost equilibrium situation. The other
significant effect was the change of family size (especially again in
the period 1989-1990), which increased the probability of violation.
4.2.2 Change in real income and relative prices
It is possible that the violating and non-violating households do not
differ with respect to their average characteristics (as suggested by
the logit estimation) but they may behave differently when facing
a change in income, relative prices, or other determinants affect-
ing their consumption. To check this, we estimated a Quadratic
Almost Ideal Demand System (QAIDS) over the pooled 1987-90
surveys, and used the convergence algorithm proposed by Banks et
al. [1997]:
wiht = αi+
∑
j
γij lnpjt+βi× ln mht
a(pt)
+
(
λi
b(pt)
× mht
a(pt)
)2
+whtγi+uiht (4.1)
with
lna(pt) = α0 +
∑
i
αilnpit + 0.5
∑
i
∑
j
γij lnpit × lnpjt
and
b(pt) =
∏
i
pβiit
where wiht is the budget share for good i, individual h, and pe-
riod t, pit is the price of good i at period t, and mht is the total
expenditure of individual h at period t. As the estimated param-
eters αi, βi, γij enter non-linearly into the equation, the first step
consists of estimating the equation (4.1) using a Stone price index
a(pt) =
∏
i p
wi
it with wi as the average budget share of good i over in-
dividuals and periods (that is, imposing α0 = γij = 0 and αi = wi).
Price elasticities are corrected in order to take into account the dif-
ference between the exact price index a(pt) and the Stone index, as
described by Pashardes [1993]. In the second step, the estimated
γij and βi are used to compute b(pt). At each step, b(pt) is updated
and thus the system is linear in parameters.
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Blundell and Robin [1999] have proved the consistency and
asymptotic efficiency of this iterative procedure on the maximum
likelihood estimate. The estimation is made under additivity and
homogeneity restrictions; although homogeneity is not accepted by
the data except for clothing (results are similar when homogeneity is
not constrained). The cross-section and time-series parameters are
estimated by pooling the four 1987-90 surveys with quarter and pe-
riod dummies to take into account all institutional changes. Cross-
section parameters are estimated on the pooled cross-section (third
iteration) and the time-series parameters on first differences (third
iteration) because the usual between and within transformations do
not converge12.
We find (Table 2.4 in Appendix II) that income elasticities are
significantly greater for the violating households concerning Food at
Home, and smaller concerning dynamic expenditures such as Food
away from Home. These differences are not significant for cross-
section estimations, probably because of the endogeneity bias due
to the correlation between the specific effects and the relative in-
come. They are significant for the first difference estimation, which
eliminates the endogeneity bias. Thus, either the income distribu-
tion and the structure of income changes differ between the two
populations, or the food expenditures of the violating households
are more sensitive to income changes.
As far as the level of well being is concerned, the violating house-
holds have a smaller total expenditure than the non-violating, by
3.7%, 3.1%, and 7.4% in the first three years. Compared to a pre-
diction (for the whole population) by variables such as age, family
composition, location, profession, and education, their total expen-
ditures are smaller by 2.5% to 4.9% between the first three years, and
greater by 3.5% in 199013. Moreover, both income and total expen-
ditures have a smaller increase for the violating households between
1988 and 1989 (+23.0% versus +32.3% for disposable income per
unit of consumption, +2.6% versus +6.7% for total expenditures),
but decrease much less between 1989 and 1990 (-32.7% versus -
39.0%, -21.3% versus -34.1%). Similar variations are observed for
low-income families. Thus, the violating households seem to have a
smaller level of well being, at least between 1987 and 1989, and seem
to be confronted with a different pattern of variation of their well
12Probably because of the high degree of non-linearity over the integrability terms b(p).
Moreover the first difference estimation eliminates more efficiently the endogeneity bias by
canceling the specific effects between two periods (recall that the within transformation only
cancels the specific effect over the whole period).
13Including income to predict total expenditures does not change this pattern.
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being during this period. This leads to the question of whether the
violating households were specifically confronted, compared to the
non-violating households, with some constraints such as subsistence
constraints14 for the poor in particular.
To estimate the number of poor we first computed the propor-
tion of households having less than the average income minus its
standard error. The rich were defined as households having more
than the average income plus its standard error. We found that the
violating population contains much more "rich" households than the
non-violating (21.7% versus 16.3% in 1987) and a few more "poor"
households. Actually, the income distribution of the violating pop-
ulation is more polarized: the income variation coefficient is 12.3 for
the violating versus 9.5 for the non-violating.
Second, we defined15 the poor using a composite index matching
three criteria: their income is smaller than the first quintile of the
whole population, their total expenditure is lower (by 25% in Table
2.5) than the average expenditure for the reference population (de-
fined by age, education, location, socio-professional category, and
family structure), and their food budget share is greater than 25%
of the average share for this reference population. We found that
the violating population contains more rich households and a bit
more poor households than the non-violating. More importantly,
one half of the households shift to another poverty class (for in-
stance, from the poor to the quasi-poor) during the whole period,
especially between 1988 and 1989, both for the violating and the
non-violating groups (see Tables 2.5 and 2.6 in Appendix II). This
indicates that these violating households have been confronted with
new living conditions and new constraints during the whole period.
Thus, the violation process may be explained as a coherent re-
sponse to the changing economic position of the household. The
next step of our paper is to build an econometric model of subsis-
tence constraints and shadow prices.
14Despite their smaller level of well-being, their budget share for food consumption is not
systematically greater than the budget share of the non-violating households or the budget
share predicted by the quadratic demand system.
15Four other social classes are defined by the same variables. The results are robust at
different definitions of the limits.
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5 Subsistence Constraints and Shadow Prices
5.1 Rationale
Polish households were confronted with drastic subsistence constraints
during 1987-1990. Indeed, their level of well-being was much affected
by inflation and macroeconomic shocks: between 1988 and 1989, the
real income per UC for households belonging to the first quartile de-
creased by 30% and increased by the same amount for households
belonging to the last quartile. The inverse change occurred between
1989 and 1990. Such constraints correspond to shadow price effects,
which may strongly influence household’s consumption and saving
decisions. In such a situation, the household’s choices can no longer
be explained by monetary prices only.
Suppose that a monetary price and two shadow prices corre-
sponding to non-monetary resources and to constraints faced by
the households, respectively, are combined together into a complete
price. Expressed in logarithm form, we have:
pc = pm + pnm + pcs (5.1)
where pc denotes the logarithm of the complete price, pm denotes
the logarithm of the monetary price, pnm denotes the logarithm of
the shadow price corresponding to non-monetary resources, and pcs
denotes the logarithm of the shadow price corresponding to con-
straints faced by the households.
However, it is not possible with our data to distinguish between
the two components of the shadow price pi = pnm + pcs.
We want to test the assumption that during this period the 240
violating households faced a change in their shadow prices through
drastic modifications of their non-monetary resources (such as a
substitution between the monetary and non-monetary component
of price due to the existence of queuing during the pre-transition
period) and the appearance of new constraints (such as subsistence
constraints).
5.2 Measuring the Shadow Prices
Suppose that two estimations of the same equation:
xiht = Zhtβi + uiht
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for good i (i = 1 to ]i), household h (with h = 1 toH) in period
t (t = 1 toT ), with Zht = (Z1ht, Z2ht), are made on both cross-
section and time-series dimensions over the same data-set.
Let us set uiht = αih + εiht, where αih is the specific effect which
contains all permanent components of the residual for individual h
and good i. As discussed by Mundlak [1978], the cross-section
estimators can be biased by a correlation between the explanatory
variables Z1ht and this specific effect. Such a correlation is due
to latent permanent variables (such as an event during childhood,
characteristics of the parents, or permanent wealth).
This correlation comes from the relationship between such la-
tent variables and some explanatory variables, like Z1ht in the cross-
section. For instance, the relative income position of the household
can be related to its wealth or to its inheritance. Those effects are
embedded in the specific effect. Thus, the correlation δi between the
time average of the explanatory variables’ vector, Z1ht =
(
zk1ht
)K1
k=1
,
transformed by the Between matrix, BZ1ht =
(
1
T
×∑t zk1ht)K1k=1 and
the specific effect αih, αih = BZ1htδi + ηih, will add to the param-
eter βi of these variables in the time average estimation Bxiht =
BZ1ht(βi + δi) + ηih + Bεiht, so that the between estimators are
biased. Thus, the difference between the cross-section and the time-
series estimators equals δi.
Let us now assume that the shadow price piiht of good i for house-
hold h in period t depends on a vector of (endogeneous) characteris-
tics Z1ht, and on a vector of (exogeneous) characteristics Z2ht, that
is:
piiht = fi(Z1ht, Z2ht) (5.2)
Let us also assume that the consumption function for good i is:
xiht = gi(pht, Z1ht, Z2ht, Sht) (5.3)
with pht as the vector of prices, pjht containing (if this vector
exists) a shadow, unknown component pijht, and Sht the vector of
all other determinants.
From the shadow price function Ziht = fi(Z1ht, Z2ht) = Z1htθ1 +
Z2htθ2 + λih + µiht, we define a vector of endogeneous variables Z1ht
as a vector of all variables correlated with the specific effect λih. For
instance, the relative income position of the household, supposed
to be invariant, can determine its location, which is correlated with
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purchase constraints. Thus, the household relative income may be
related to permanent components of the shadow prices correspond-
ing to these constraints. The vector of exogeneous variables Z2ht is
therefore a determinant of the shadow price, which is not correlated
with λih.
The shadow prices are unknown and do not appear in the con-
sumption function (5.3). However, their influence is included in the
residual, so that the specific effect αih of the consumption function
(with a residual uiht = αih+εiht) contains λih. Therefore, the coeffi-
cients of the endogeneous variables Z1ht in the consumption function
are subject to an endogeneity bias, which makes their cross-section,
and time-series estimators, different, while the exogeneous variables
have coefficients which do not differ between these two dimensions.
Thus, the part of the shadow prices, which is explained by Z1ht, can
be identified by the endogeneity bias in the consumption function,
observed as the difference between the cross-section and time-series
estimations of the coefficients of Z1ht.
Indeed, the marginal propensity to consume with respect to Z1ht,
when considering the effect of the shadow prices pijht on consump-
tion, can be written:
dxiht
dZ1ht
=
dgi
dZ1ht
+
∑
j
dgi
dpijht
× dpijht
dZ1ht
(5.4)
The second term differs between cross-section and time-series
variations because of the endogeneity bias in the shadow price in-
clination with respect to Z1ht. So, comparing two different house-
holds surveyed in the same period, this bias adds to the direct con-
sumption propensity with respect to Z1ht, as estimated on time-
series. This parameter will therefore differ between cross-section
and time-series estimations. For instance, the influence of the head
of household’s age cohort or income may differ on cross-sections and
time-series if the shadow prices depend on cohort effects or relative
income position (the same can occur for monetary prices). Hence
the comparison of estimations computed on cross-sections and time-
series reveals the difference of the shadow price system between two
households.
The component
∑
j
dgi
dpijht
× dpijht
dZ1ht
of the marginal propensity of en-
dogenous variables can be used to identify the shadow prices’ vari-
ation over Z1ht,
dpijht
dZ1ht
, since it can be computed by resolving a sys-
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tem of n linear equations after having estimated the price marginal
propensities dgi
dpij
= γij.
We consider here only the direct effect through the price of good
i: γii × dpiidZ1 of the variables Z1ht, so that:
dpii
dZ1
=
β
(c.s.)
i − β(t.s.)i
γii
(5.5)
Note that the price effect γii is supposed to be the same for
monetary and shadow prices. Thus, the change between two periods
in the shadow price can be written:
dlnpiiht =
∑
k
(
dpii
dzk1
).dzk1ht
Under the homogeneity assumption (of degree m) of the shadow
prices over variables Z1ht, the value of the shadow prices can be
computed as lnpiiht = m×
∑
k(
dpii
dzk1
).dzk1ht. However, this homogeneity
assumption is quite strong, and we would prefer to compute only
the change in the shadow logarithmic prices. Let us call Ia and
Iq the absolute and quadratic average indices for the absolute and
quadratic changes in the shadow logarithmic price:
Ia(pi
v) =
1
H
×
∑
h
[
1
T − 1
∑
t
∑
i
wi.|dlnpiiht|
]
(5.6)
and
Iq(pi
v) =
√√√√ 1
H
×
∑
h
[
1
T − 1
∑
t
∑
i
wi.(dlnpiiht)2
]
(5.7)
5.3 Results
We compute the shadow prices by estimating a Quadratic Demand
System separately for the two types of households. However, since
the non-violating population is much more numerous, it is not easy
to compare the endogeneity biases between the two populations.
Moreover, the estimation is less significant for the violating house-
holds (see Appendix IV for details). Thus, our preferred estimation
was performed on the whole population with a dummy variable in-
dicating the violating households only for the logarithmic income
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and squared logarithmic income variables, which differ significantly
(see section 4.2 and Table 2.4 in Appendix II). Therefore the vari-
ations of the shadow prices indicate the changes in the conditions
of choice for the two populations, weighted by the differences be-
tween the same cross-section and the time-series estimators (except
for income).
The estimations are performed through cross-section (either pool-
ing the four years in the tables in Appendix III, or averaging them
into between data in Table 4) and time-series (either on the first
differences between two years in Appendix III, or using the within
operator in Table 4). To compute the shadow prices, we compare
the cross-section and time-series estimators. For this purpose, we
can either equalize the consumptions or their budget shares. The
results are similar (see the discussion in Appendix IV and the results
in table 3.1, Appendix III). The price elasticities differ in various es-
timations. The shadow prices strongly depend on the price marginal
propensity to consume of the good i (measured by the price coef-
ficient γii used in formula (5.5)). We calibrate it under the Frisch
constraint between income and price elasticities:
Epi = −$.Eyi ⇒ γii = (1−$).wi −$.βi
where Epi and E
y
i are respectively the direct price-elasticity and
the income-elasticity for good i, $ is the Frisch income flexibility
(calibrated as 0.5 as recommended by Selvanathan [1993, Chap-
ter 6]), and βi is the estimated coefficient of log-income in an AI
Demand System estimation. Table 4 below and Tables 5.1 and 5.2
in Appendix III present an average of the shadow price absolute
or quadratic differences between two periods for the violating and
non-violating populations.
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Table 4. Index of Quadratic Changes of the Logarithmic Shadow Prices.
All Expenditures Food at Home Housing Clothing
Iq(piv) (dlnpiiht)
2 (dlnpiiht)
2 (dlnpiiht)
2
NV V NV V NV V NV V
Period
1987− 88 1.29 1.498 0.078 0.109 0.07 0.086 0.031 0.022
(.01) (.021) (.005) (.013) (.003) (.006) (.001) (.001)
1988− 89 1.5 1.665 0.098 0.137 0.08 0.119 0.037 0.025
(.006) (.014) (.007) (.017) (.003) (.009) (.001) (.001)
1989− 90 1.835 2.039 0.159 0.204 0.134 0.172 0.063 0.039
(.005) (.011) (.015) (.031) (.007) (.016) (.002) (.002)
Legend.
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
Estimation of the Demand System.
Estimation of a QAIDS under additivity and homogeneity constraints, on Between and Within
Transformations for 1987-1990. See Table 2.4 in Appendix II for the specification on instru-
mented total expenditures.
Computation of the shadow prices.
dlnpiiht =
∑
i(
dpiiht
dZ1ht
).dZ1ht with
dpii
dZ1
=
β
(c.s.)
i −β
(t.s.)
i
γii
.
Only changes dZ1h of log-income and its square, logarithmic age of the head of household
and the proportion of children in the family are taken into account16. The shadow price is
computed equalizing the budget share (Index TP2 defined in Table 3.1 of Appendix III).
Quadratic Index.17 Iq(piv) =
√
1
H
×∑h [ 1T−1∑t∑i wi.(dlnpiiht)2]
Computation of the variances. See Appendix V
Three main conclusions:
1. The variations of shadow prices are significantly different from
zero18 for almost all groups of commodities and for the general
indexes Ia(piv) and Iq(piv). So, these shadow prices may distort
the optimal consumption choices of the household.
2. The change in the shadow prices increases significantly dur-
ing the period. Moreover this increase is particularly large be-
tween 1989 and 1990, when inflation, households’ income, and
economic institutions were experiencing a dramatic change.
16When adding the logarithmic relative prices to endogeneous variables Z1ht supposed to
contain these four determinants, one must use price parameters which depend, for cross-
sections on quarter price changes and differences between social categories, and for time-series,
on annual price changes. The differences between the four social categories are known only
for one period, so that the cross-section and time-series estimators of the price parameters
may be similar. The difference between cross-section and times-series estimators is probably
due to random factors. Thus, it seems better to take only the four determinants into account.
17An index of absolute variations leads to similar results. Estimations on pooled cross-
sections and first differences under different hypotheses upon the price coefficient used to
compute the shadow prices and the differentiation of the two populations in the estimation
also give similar results (see Table 3.1 and Table 5.2 in Appendix III).
18Normality being assumed for index Iq . The distribution of Iq was indeed explored by a
Monte Carlo Simulation (see Appendix V).
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3. The change in shadow prices for all commodities is greater
among the violating households, by 4% to 11%, for the quadratic
distance in19 Table 4. The same generally applies for Food at
Home, Housing and Clothing expenditures (which sum up to
74% of all expenditures). Thus, it seems that, between 1987
and 1990, the violating households are confronted with sig-
nificantly greater changes in their environment than the non-
violating ones.
Finally, according to our parametric tests, the change in shadow
prices (identified by the endogeneity biases in cross-section models)
is large for both populations and significantly greater for the vio-
lating households during the whole period. Thus, as suggested by
our non-parametric tests, violation of rationality axioms by the 240
households seems to be a "rational" adjustment of their behavior to
special choice conditions.
6 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to contribute to the current discus-
sion on the compatibility of consumers’ behavior in "real" life with
the choice consistency axioms. Using expenditure panel data we ob-
served a relatively low rate of GARP, SARP, WARP violation (240
out of 3630 households). Using a shadow prices concept, we showed
that the observed violations can be explained by the households’ un-
observed specific choice conditions, such as economic environment
distortions, constraints, or opportunities. That is, the observed vi-
olations are not really contradictory with rational behavior axioms.
The data covered a period of very high price variations and
smaller real income changes. Budget intersections were therefore
more likely to occur, as were the violations of the axioms. Prices
were quarterly observed and differentiated by socio-professional cat-
egory allowing a good computation of quantities. However, while
the relative Bronars method 2 power and the Afriat Power Index
are satisfying (155.5% and 1.01 respectively), the Bronars method
2 power is very low (17%).
19The change is still greater for different specifications of the consumption function and of
the calibration of the price coefficient used to compute the shadow prices (see Appendix IV).
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A Appendix I: Robustness of the non-parametric
tests
A.1 Method.
Since the tests are non-parametric, we need to be very careful about their ro-
bustness.
First, we need to take into account the "trivial respect" and "trivial viola-
tion" of the axioms.
A trivial respect of the axioms arises when, given (xi, xj) , the total expendi-
ture of xi evaluated at a reference price p0 is sharply "greater" than the one of xj
evaluated at the same reference price. Indeed, in such a case we have pixi > pixj
and pjxi > pjxj . Famulari [1995] has developed the following method: She
chooses a reference price p0 and evaluates all the consumption vectors at this
price. The total expenditure of a vector xi, evaluated at this constant price p0,
will be denoted Mi = p0.xi. If a bundle xi is much more expensive (according
to Mi) than a bundle xj , it will probably be preferred. Therefore, taking into
account the comparison of these two bundles will arbitrary increase the num-
ber of couples consistent with GARP. According to Famulari, (xi, xj) respects
GARP if the following index 2×(Mi−Mj)(Mi+Mj) is less than a threshold K arbitrary
defined by the experimenter. She takes four different levels for K: 5%, 10%,
15% and 20%. The interpretation is the following, if K = k0%, it means that
we will take into account only the (xi, xj) such that total expenditures of xi and
xj evaluated at constant price p0 are different by less than k0%.
(xi, xj) trivially violates the axioms if the total expenditures of xi and xj
evaluated at the available price pi are closed. In such a case, the bundles xi
and xj could be considered, by the agent, as identical in such a way that we
have pixi ≥ pixj and pjxj > pjxi. In order to take into account possible trivial
violations, we follow Afriat [1967], who suggests to use the binary relations
Re and RSe :
∀ xi, xj , xi Re xj ⇔ pixj ≤ e× pixi (A.1)
∀ xi, xj , xi RSe xj ⇔ pixj < e× pixi (A.2)
where e ∈ [0, 1] is known as the Afriat Efficiency Index (Varian [1990]).
Second, we need to evaluate the power of the tests. From a statistical view-
point the power of a test between two hypotheses is the probability of rejecting
the null hypothesis while the alternative hypothesis is true. In our case, the for-
mer is that the consumer behavior satisfies the axiom we tested, and the latter
that it does not. Unfortunately, because the non-parametric tests of WARP,
GARP, and SARP are non-probabilistic, their power is unknown. However,
there is a consensus in the literature consisting in computing an approximate
power of the nonparametric test. Several methods to approximate the power
on non-parametric tests have been developed (see Andreoni and Harbaugh
[2006] for a review of the existing methods), but the most popular is the one
by Bronars [1987]. Bronars computes the approximate power of the test by
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taking as an alternative hypothesis the Becker’s [1962] notion that the choices
of the individuals are made at random (more precisely, choices are probabilistic
and are uniformly distributed on the budget set). In this paper, we computed
the so-called Bronars Method 2 which draws a number of random budget shares
in which the expected share is 1/n, where n is the number of goods. The abso-
lute Bronars power index is defined as the average percentage of SARP, GARP,
or WARP violating individuals over the K fictive random consumption data
exhausting the budget set. The Relative Bronars Power Index is defined as the
relative increase of the number of SARP, GARP, or WARP violating individ-
uals when testing the axioms over the initial data sets and over the random
consumption data sets20.
We have performed another power test called, by Andreoni andHarbaugh
[2006], the Afriat Power Index (API). The API is defined as the smallest value
of g such that that there is at least one violation of H − GARP (g). The H −
GARP (g) axiom is defined as follows: if xiTRgxj , then g × xjpj ≤ xipj , where
TRg is the transitive closure of the binary relation Rg defined by xiRgxj ⇐⇒
g × xipi ≥ xjpi, g ≥ 1. According to Andreoni and Harbaugh [2006, page
10], an API ≤ 1.05 is "an acceptably powerful test of GARP".
A.2 Results.
A.2.1 Absolute and Relative Bronars Powers.
Let us now introduce the results concerning the absolute and relative Bronars
powers for 10 random samples (we have also calculated the power over 1000
random samples and we found almost the same average number of violating
households as in the case of 10 random samples).
The absolute Bronars method 2 power index (i.e. the percentage of violating
households in the random samples) is about 17%. This figure is clearly low.
However, the relative Bronars power index (i.e. the relative increase of the
number of violating households from the initial data set to the random one)
is about 155.5%: 240 violating households on the initial data set and 613.3
violating households on average on the 10 random samples (see table 1.1 and
table 1.2 below).
Table 1.1. Simultaneous tests of SARP over a 10 random samples
with respect to Becker’s definition
(standard-error in brackets)
Non-Respect of SARP
Number of households (means) 613.3
(20.14)
20In order to understand the relative Bronars power index, suppose that when testing GARP
over a given data set, the absolute Bronars power index is 99%. What can we conclude if, at
the same time, the percentage of GARP violating individuals on this data set is 98% ? Let
us compare this example with the following one where, when testing GARP over a data set,
the absolute Bronars power index is 30%, but the percentage of GARP-violating individuals
on this data set is 1%. Since the relative increase of GARP-violating individuals is greater in
the second example than in the first one, we will say that the relative Bronars power index
(that is the relative increase of GARP-violating individuals from the initial data sets to the
random consumption data sets) is bigger in the second example than in the first one.
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Table 1.2. Afriat Efficiency Tests over the households violating SARP over the 10 random
samples.
Sample I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
e = 1 590 611 617 590 615 648 643 612 615 592
e = 0.99 420 457 440 428 453 472 464 431 462 439
e = 0.98 318 335 306 305 325 336 341 311 322 308
e = 0.94 70 87 83 89 102 95 100 84 88 73
e = 0.90 16 15 22 20 22 21 23 13 19 15
e = 0.87 5 6 4 7 6 4 3 4 1 4
e = 0.86 4 3 2 5 4 1 2 3 1 2
e = 0.85 2 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 0 0
e = 0.84 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
e = 0.83 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
e = 0.82 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
e = 0.81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A.2.2 Afriat Power Index
We discover over our data sets an API of 1.01. Let us remind that, according
to Andreoni and Harbaugh [2006, page 10], an API ≤ 1.05 is "an acceptably
powerful test of GARP".
A.2.3 Famulari Robustness Test
Let us now discuss the robustness concerning the 3390 households, with respect
to the axioms. (xi, xj) trivially respects the axioms when the total expenditure
of xi evaluated at a constant price is sharply "greater" than the one of xj evalu-
ated at the same constant price. When taking into account only the (xi, xj), for
which total expenditures of xi and xj evaluated at a constant price are different
by less than K = 20%, 94.2% of the initial 3390 households remain consistent.
For K = 15%, 10%, and 5%, the figures are 83.5%, 63.4%, and 33.5% respec-
tively. The results concerning the households fulfilling the axioms look robust
since even at K = 5% a large proportion of households are still consistent with
the axioms (see Table 1.3 below and Part A.1. of this appendix for the definition
of K). Moreover, a logistic regression (see Table 2.3 in Appendix II) shows that
the larger the variation in absolute value of real expenditure per UC, the greater
the probability of violating the axioms. Thus, the increase of real expenditure
is ceteris paribus, and not a cause of respecting the axioms.
Table 1.3. Simultaneous tests of SARP, GARP, and WARP keeping in the revealed
preference relation R only those (xi, xj) for which the total expenditures on xi and on xj ,
calculated at a reference price, are different by less than K%.
Respect of SARP, GARP and WARP
K = 20% 3194 households
K = 15% 2832 households
K = 10% 2149 households
K = 5% 1139 households
A.2.4 Afriat Efficiency Test
Let us finally discuss the robustness of the 240 households, which violate the
axioms. Table 1.4 below gives the results of the Afriat Efficiency test (see
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Part A.1. of this Appendix for the definition). At e = 0.99, 54.6% of the 240
households still violate the axioms but at e = 0.87, none of them violate the
axioms. However, at e = 0.87, almost all of the 3630 fictive agents we have built
also fulfill the axioms (see table 1.2 above).
Table 1.4. Afriat Efficiency Tests over the 240 households
violating SARP, GARP, and WARP.
Non Respect of SARP, GARP, and WARP
e = 1.00 240 households
e = 0.99 131 households
e = 0.98 84 households
e = 0.97 48 households
e = 0.96 30 households
e = 0.95 18 households
e = 0.94 12 households
e = 0.93 8 households
e = 0.92 6 households
e = 0.91 3 households
e = 0.90 2 households
e = 0.89 1 households
e = 0.88 1 households
e = 0.87 0 households
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Table 2.1. Means and standard deviations of variables used in the Polish panel analyses.
1987 1988 1989 1990
Budget share for food 0.480 0.461 0.469 0.540
(.14) (.15) (.18) (.15)
Real total per cu expenditure index 100 105.7 118.6 79.9
(1987=100)
Relative food price index 0.961 0.902 0.992 1.145
(pfood/ptotal) (.013) (.06) (.19) (.03)
Ln household total expenditure 10.65 11.17 12.25 14.14
(.45) (.49) (.79) (.50)
Ln head’s age 3.789 3.809 3.824 3.842
(.33) (.32) (.32) (.32)
Consumer units number 2.500 2.471 2.432 2.415
(.98) (.99) (.986) (.98)
Ln family size 1.140 1.121 1.095 1.081
(.59) (.60) (.61) (.61)
Number of Households 3630 3630 3630 3630
Table 2.2. Average budget shares.
Budget shares 1987 1988 1989 1990
Food 0.432 0.400 0.435 0.483
Alcohol and tobacco 0.041 0.037 0.031 0.129
Clothing 0.129 0.141 0.145 0.096
Dwelling 0.110 0.112 0.125 0.097
Energy 0.033 0.039 0.022 0.039
Health and hygiene 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.026
Transp. and communic. 0.050 0.062 0.063 0.066
Culture and entertain. 0.066 0.078 0.075 0.080
Other 0.028 0.025 0.020 0.031
Financial operations 0.087 0.081 0.057 0.050
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Table 2.3. Violation Probabilities According to Various Socio-economic Characteristics
Logistic Function Regression.
Budget shares Parameter Estimates Standard Error
Intercept -3.1525 0.2755
%Change in real per UC
total expenditure (88-87) 0.2218 0.1959
%Change in real per UC
total expenditure (89-88) 0.4830 0.2125
%Change in real per UC
total expenditure (90-89) 0.8111 0.1843
Change in food budget coeff (88-87) 0.4726 0.7823
Change in food budget coeff (89-88) 0.8673 0.6761
Change in food budget coeff (90-89) 0.8082 0.6384
Change in family size (88-87) -0.1307 0.1316
Change in family size (89-88) -0.2744 0.1631
Change in family size (90-89) 0.2834 0.1103
Family head’s age (less than 40)
(ref)
Family head’s age (41-60) -0.0227 0.1705
Family head’s age more than 60 -0.1750 0.2693
Location (large city)
(ref)
Location (average size city) 0.3327 0.2370
Location (small town) -0.2552 0.3553
Location (countryside) 0.3124 0.2128
Education (college-university level)
(ref)
Education (average level) -0.1140 0.1643
Education (primary school level) -0.0311 0.2934
Wage earners
(ref)
Farmers 0.0174 0.2269
Mixed: farmers and wage earners -0.3551 0.2343
Retired People 0.3624 0.2329
Survey’s quarter (1)
(ref)
Survey’s quarter (2) 0.1609 0.2052
Survey’s quarter (3) 0.4147 0.2022
Survey’s quarter (4) 0.3766 0.2121
Dependent Variable: Violating households = 1, otherwise=0
Number of observations: 3630
Model Fitting Information and Testing Global Null Hypothesis BETA=0
Intercept Intercept and Chi square
Only Covariates for covariates
-2LOGL 1767.618 1713.969 53.649 with 22 DF (p=0.0002)
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Table 2.4. Income Elasticities (QAIDS).
Cross-section First-difference
Elasticities Elasticities
NV V NV V
Food at home 0.637 0.747 0.774 1.022
(.015) (.054) (.018) (.064)
Food away 1.574 1.128 1.574 -0.005
(.211) (.564) (.253) (.744)
Alcohol and tobacco 1.115 0.778 0.976 0.580
(.041) (.051) (.048) (.174)
Dwelling 1.311 1.495 1.316 1.427
(.044) (.054) (.062) (.227)
Energy 0.358 0.185 0.805 0.583
(.071) (.039) (.095) (.341)
Clothing 1.080 1.111 1.026 0.861
(.031) (.107) (.041) (.148)
Transport and 1.676 1.715 1.261 1.144
(.059) (.207) (.078) (.277)
Communication
Health and Hygiene 0.627 0.564 0.681 0.442
(.043) (.049) (.057) (.197)
Culture and Education 1.529 1.280 1.327 0.921
(.047) (.067) (.067) (.232)
Other 1.377 1.516 1.278 1.354
(.071) (.213) (.103) (.288)
Financial Operations 1.834 1.398 1.399 0.790
(.059) (.212) (.081) (.287)
Legend.
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
Estimation: wiht = αi +
∑
j γij lnpjt + βi × ln
mht
a(pt)
+
(
λi
b(pt)
× mht
a(pt)
)2
+ whtγi + uiht
with lna(pt) = α0 +
∑
i αilnpit + 0.5
∑
i
∑
j γij lnpit × lnpjt and b(pt) =
∏
i p
βi
it
Logarithm of total Expenditures instrumented.
Other determinants: logarithmic age of the head of household, proportion of children in the family,
relative logarithmic prices, education and location dummies, and quarter dummies for each year.
The true price index is approximated by a Stone price index.
Estimation: By convergence, third iteration for both dimensions on the integrability parameter
b(pt). Additivity and homogeneity constrained.
Dataset: Polish panel including 3630 households for period 1987.I-1990.IV.
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Table 2.5. Proportion of Social Classes in 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1990 (%).
Poor Quasi Middle Quasi Rich
Poor Class Rich
1987 NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V
k = 0.25 143(a) 13 918 65 1282 89 916 63 131 10
4.22%(b) 5.42 27.08 27.08 37.82 37.08 27.02 26.25 3.86 4.17
k = 0.15 223 21 701 48 1592 109 675 47 199 15
6.58% 8.75 20.68 20.00 46.9 45.10 19.91 19.58 5.87 6.25
k = 0.10 266 26 563 38 1770 123 556 35 235 18
7.85% 10.83 16.61 15.83 52.21 16.40 51.25 14.58 6.93 7.50
1988 NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V
k = 0.10 8.2% 7.5 16.8 18.3 51.6 50.4 15.6 12.9 7.7 10.8
k = 0.25 4.2% 3.8 27.1 27.1 38.5 37.9 25.5 25.4 4.7 5.8
1989 NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V
k = 0.10 8.9% 10.4 16.3 15.8 48.4 53.3 16.3 12.1 10.1 8.3
k = 0.25 5.10% 4.17 26.0 29.8 36.3 39.2 25.2 20.8 7.4 6.3
1990 NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V
k = 0.10 5.84% 5.92 17.0 15.4 51.9 53.3 16.2 15.00 9.0 10
k = 0.25 2.42% 1.25 27.6 26.7 37.2 39.2 27.7 25.8 5.0 7.9
Legend.
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
Poverty criteria:
(i) Income per unit of consumption below the first quintile.
(ii) Total expenditure per unit of consumption smaller than (1− k) time the average for a reference
population.
(iii) Budget share for food at home greater than (1 + k) the average for a reference population.
Definition of social classes:
The rich are defined symmetrically, the quasi-poor (respectively the quasi-rich) as having two over
the three attributes of the poor (respectively the rich) and not being rich (respectively the poor)
for the third.
Frequency (a) and Percentage (b) of violating (V) or non-violating (NV) households.
Table 2.6. Social Class Changes: Proportion of households changing to other social classes
between two years.
1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 Average
NV V NV V NV V NV V
k = 0.1; nc = 1 0.460 0.429 0.592 0.554 0.524 0.517 0.525 0.500
k = 0.1; nc > 1 0.079 0.092 0.168 0.163 0.112 0.100 0.120 0.118
k = 0.25; nc > 1 0.038 0.042 0.145 0.133 0.077 0.088 0.087 0.088
Legend.
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
k is the parameter defined in Table 2.5.
nc is the number of social class change.
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Table 3.1. Absolute Changes in Logarithmic Shadow Prices: Ia(piv).
TP1 TP2 DP TP1’ TP2’ DP’
NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V NV V
Period
87− 88 0.193 0.154 0.286 0.315 0.188 0.258 0.135 0.108 0.108 0.141 0.130 0.186
88− 89 0.214 0.173 0.119 0.351 0.208 0.287 0.148 0.122 0.118 0.157 0.142 0.210
89− 90 0.282 0.217 0.131 0.441 0.274 0.358 0.197 0.152 0.157 0.196 0.188 0.262
Legend.
Ia(pi
v) = 1H ×
∑
h
[
1
T−1
∑
t
∑
i wi.|dlnpiiht|
]
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
TP1 = Total population, budget share equalized: price marginal propensity = βii
TP1’ = Total population, expenditure equalized: price marginal propensity = βii − wi
TP2 = Total population, budget share equalized and differenced income and squared income coef-
ficients.
TP2’ = Total population, expenditure equalized and differenced income and squared income coef-
ficients.
DP = Different populations (violating versus non-violating), budget share equalized.
DP’ = Different populations (violating versus non-violating), expenditure equalized.
Table 3.2. Indexes of changes in logarithmic shadow prices.
Index for Index for Index for Index for
all expenditures food at home clothing housing
NV NV V V NV V NV V NV V
Iq(piv) Ia(piv) Iq(piv) Ia(piv) Iq(piv) Iq(piv) Iq(piv) Iq(piv) Iq(piv) Iq(piv)
1987− 88 0.236 0.286 0.812 0.315 0.007 0.039 0.007 0.034 0.002 0.002
(.009) (.017) (.0005) (.0026) (.0002) (.0014) (.0001) (.0003)
1988− 89 0.0265 0.119 0.902 0.351 0.008 0.050 0.005 0.047 0.003 0.002
(.006) (.012) (.0005) (.0035) (.0002) (.0022) (.0001) (.0003)
1989− 90 1.287 0.131 1.137 0.441 0.129 0.073 0.007 0.069 0.034 0.003
(.003) (.009) (.015) (.006) (.0021) (.0037) (.0017) (.0004)
Legend.
NV = Non-violating households, V = Violating households
Estimation: Separately on pooled cross section and first differences. The variance of the difference
of the two estimators is taken as the sum of the variances of each estimator. Estimation TP2.
Quadratic index : Iq(piv) =
√
1
H ×
∑
h
[
1
T−1
∑
t
∑
i wi.(dlnpiiht)
2
]
Absolute index : Ia(piv) = 1H ×
∑
h
[
1
T−1
∑
t
∑
i wi.|dlnpiiht|
]
Index variances: see Appendix IV.
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D Appendix IV
D.1 Revelation of the shadow prices.
Two problems arise in the computation of shadow prices:
First, the shadow prices are computed in section 5.2 by equalizing the es-
timated budget share by cross-section plus the shadow price effect and
the estimated budget share on time series. This method assumes that
the constant term is the same in the two estimations. Thus, the levels
of the revealed shadow prices are disputable. However, the variation of
the shadow prices between two periods, say dlpvit =
∑
i
dpii
dZ1h
.dZ1ht with
dpii
dZ1h
= β
(c.s.)
i −β(t.s.)i
γii
, is more reliable.
Second, it is also possible to reveal the variation of the shadow prices by equal-
izing the expenditures instead of the budget shares. Let us consider a
logarithmic equation:
LogCi = Z.β
(c.s.)
i + u
(c.s.)
i = Z.β
(t.s.)
i + E
p
i logpii + u
(t.s.)
i
with Epi the direct price-elasticity and Ci the consumption of good i.
By separating the parameters of income from other determinants, we get
dlogpii
dZ1h
=
β
(c.s.)
i − β(t.s.)i
γii − wi
, with wi as the average budget share for commodity i (this is easily proved
by equalizing the income elasticities of this logarithmic specification with
the elasticity computed by an AI specification).
Thus, to reveal the shadow prices, the two above hypotheses amount to
dividing the difference between cross-section and time series estimators, either
by γii, or by (γii − wi).
D.2 Estimation for the two sub-populations.
Let us estimate the following model y = xβ + u over two sub-populations of
sizes n and n′ with n < n′. Let βˆ be the estimator of the vector of parameters
for the sub-population of size n, and Let βˆ′ be the estimator of the vector of
parameters for the sub-population of size n′.
These estimators can be written βˆ = β + tσ and βˆ′ = β′ + t′σ with β and
β′ as the true parameters and σ the standard error of the parameters which is
supposed to be the same for the two parameters.
We suppose also that:
• βˆ and βˆ′ are independent.
• The expected mean of t = the expected mean of t′ = 0.
• The standard error of t = the standard error of t′ = s.
34
• ∂s∂N < 0, where N is the population’s size.
This implies: βˆ − βˆ′ = (β − β′) + (t− t′)σ and V ar(βˆ − βˆ′) = 2s2σ2.
The difference between the estimators on the two populations is not biased
with respect to 0, but it decreases with the size of the sub-populations.
Therefore, the difference between cross-sections and time-series estimators,
which is a component of the shadow prices’ formulas, is probably greater for the
smaller population and that may artificially increase the variation of the shadow
prices. Hence the shadow prices computed over the violating households are
over-estimated compared to those computed through a regression over the non-
violating households (remember that the non-violating households are about ten
times more numerous than the violating households).
On the other hand, estimating the difference β(c.s.) − β(t.s.) on the whole
population and using this difference to compute the shadow prices for the two
populations (violating/non-violating) can be considered misspecified. Indeed,
we have proved that the consumption behavior differs between the two popu-
lations at least for the income parameters (Table 2.4). Since the income and
squared income coefficients are well estimated for both populations, the method
that we prefer for computing the shadow prices consists in estimating β(c.s.)
and β(t.s.) on the whole population with dummies indicating the violating and
non-violating for the income coefficients (column TP2 in Table 3.1, Appendix
III).
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E Appendix V: Distribution of the Quadratic In-
dex of Shadow Prices
E.1 Computation of the variances:
The quadratic index writes: Iq(piv) =
√
1
H .
∑
h
(
1
T−1
∑
t
∑
i wi.(dlnpiiht)2
)
.
(i) The logarithmic virtual prices dlnpiiht are normally distributed as linear
transformations of the differences between cross-sections and time-series
parameters (which are, by assumption, normal). The variance of dlnpiiht
is :
V ar(dlnpiiht) = (dZ1ht)V ar[βB − βW ](dZ1ht)′
with V ar[βB − βW ] = V ar(βB) + V ar(βW ) : see Baltagi [1995, p.69].
(ii) The variance of (dlnpiiht)2 can be computed using the formula characteriz-
ing normal variables (here dlnpiiht) :
V ar[(dlnpiiht)2] = 2σ4i + 4m
2
iσ
2
i (E.1)
with mi and σi respectively the mean and standard-error of dlnpii. Thus,
under an independence assumption, the variance of the square of the
quadratic index Iq is the weighed average of these variances:
V ar
[∑
i
wi(dlnpiiht)2
]
=
∑
i
w2i [2σ
4
i + 4m
2
iσ
2
i ]
(iii) Finally, we assume (hypothesis 1.iii) that Iq is normal, so that the formula
(E.1) applies also to this index and its square:
V ar(I2q ) = 2(V ar(Iq))
2 + 4(E(Iq))2.V ar(Iq)
The positive solution for this equation writes:
V ar(Iq) = −I2q +
√
I4q + 0.5V ar(I2q )
The different elements of this formula are taken as the average of I2q and its
variance over each sub-population composed respectively of the violating
and non-violating households.
E.2 Distribution of the quadratic index Iq:
As a weighted average of non-centered heteroskedastic normal variables, Iq has
no known distribution (let us point out however that in mathematical-statistics
there are - in very special cases unfortunately - some non-centered limit theo-
rems). The Jarque-Bera statistic amounts to 181.58 and is higher than the limit
of a χ2(2 df). As a consequence, the distribution of Iq does not seem to be a
normal distribution.
Nevertheless, we keep our assumption that Iq follows a normal distribution
because a Monte Carlo experiment for 300 households and 80 draws shows that
its histogram is close to the one of a normal distribution (see appendix E.3).
Therefore, we use the computed variances to test whether the quadratic index
is significantly different from zero and greater for the violating households.
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E.3 Histogram of Iq
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Legend. 
X-axis: Iq. 
Y-axis: % of population. 
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